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A SKEPTICAL APPRECIATION 
OF NATURAL LAW THEORY· 
Robert Ginsberg 
These are the confessions of a philosopher who does not 
start from, as many in this audience do, Natural Law Theory, 
but has variously criticized and avoided it, only to come to it. 
This story of how 1 carne to be a Natural Law philosopher des-
pite myself may prove instructive both as the finding fault with 
Natural Law Theory and as the finding of its merits in respon-
ding to supposed faults. This is a sketch of a dialogue on Natu-
ral Law in my mind, and you are invited to take part in it, 
filling in the positions pro and contra with more substance 
and insight. 
1. The strongest antipathy 1 have had toward Natural Law 
Theory is its absolutismo This takes the form of an overconfi-
dent faith in reason, an unwavering commitment to the content 
of supposed Natural Laws, and a too eager grounding in di vine 
guarantees. Natural Law is too neat, too proud, too presump-
tuous. Everything fits intelligibly in a Natural Law scheme. AH 
great problems are already resolved in Natural Law; the only 
thing we have to worry about in the practical conduct of the 
world is making applications conform to the timeless and uni-
versal principies. Natural Law, then, is a philosopher's philo-
sophy because it connects everything and has a reliable answer 
for everything. It raises the philosopher up from the contingen-
cíes of this world to another realm, pervasive, stable, accessible 
by reason, established by divinity, and applicable in aH times. 
• Texto de la intervención del autor en la reunión de la Natural Law 
Society, celebrada con ocasión del XIII Congreso Mundial de Filosofía del 
Derecho y Filosofía Social que tuvo lugar en Kobe (Japón) del 20 al 26 de 
agosto de 1987. 
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And as the philosopher's mind dwells in that higher realm a 
consoling peace of mind is the reward even for one living in a 
sordid and lawless daily world. Natural Law, finally, is a 
source of the soul's salvation. 
All this is too good to be true. It is a dazzling portrayal of 
an ideal realm. Natural Law is the philosopher's dream par 
excellence. Its agreeable deception is overriding orderliness. 
Natural Law aspires to deductive formulation. It refuses to 
accept the world and the universe as fundamentally chaotic, 
fragmented, arbitrary, or disconnected. Those features of our expe-
rience are repugnant to reason. Yet those features have attracted 
me. They are what makes existence interesting as much as do 
orderliness and repeatability. Y es, I too want the universe to fit 
togther in accordance with one set of laws, a unified field 
theory of physics and ethics, but I waive that passion in favor 
of choosing to see existence in its multifarious disconnected-
ness. Each feature of the universe, such as international law, 
has pluralistic grounds of plausible ordering, and no connection 
need be sought between features, say, moral principIes and 
international law. The universe comes to me piecemeal, and I 
wish to respond to it in its irreducible diversity. Natural Law 
leaps too quickly beyond the problems amid which I dwell. 
How I admire Aquinas so easily stating that the laws of nature 
are intelligible, that human nature is governed by such laws as 
well, and our natural intelligence suffices to grasp natural laws. 
How agreeable is the temptation to accept that visiono But I 
stagger back from it, advancing the doubt that nature (whatever 
that is) is governed by laws (whatever those are) in sorne uni-
form way graspable by our mind. The very assertion of intelli-
gibility is an imposition of our mind (or our minds) of images, 
desires, preferences, and probably other non-intellectual things, 
upon the brute encounter of the universe. I doubt that intelli-
gence is the measure of all being. And to trust that human inte-
lligence is the intelligence able to grasp nature's laws is to be 
mistakenly overconfident. Human intelligence itself is problema-
tic. It is susceptible to diverse plausible definitions . Natural 
Law loses its assured means of access once we put in doubt the 
operation of our intelligence. Reason is doubly at the heart of 
Natural Law, for a principIe of Natural Law is a principIe of 
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reason and perforce is available to discovery and confirmation 
by reason. Reason, then, is both instrument and content of 
Natural Law. We professional reasoners know from experience 
that reason may be driven by passion, that reason may operate 
by incommensurable forms or commitments, that reason gets 
carried away with itself and rationalizes, that absurdity, contin-
gency, contradiction, dilemma, and paradox might not be rea-
soned away, and that the heart has its reasons of which the 
reason knows nought. Distrust of reason is the first duty of a 
philosopher. Thus, when Marcus Aurelius writes to himself in 
Greek of the principIes graspable by reason that underlie the 
souls of every person, slave and emperor, as weH as underlying 
the cosmos, has not this Roman Emperor exchanged imperial 
pride for overweening pride in reason? 
Natural Law Theory can answer these charges about the 
disorderliness of nature, the unreliability of reason, and the gap 
between human intelligence and intelligible cosmos. God is the 
guarantor. Natural Law has adivine legislator. The author of 
our intelligence and the rest of our human nature, as Aquinas 
puts it, is also the author of nature and its laws. A supreme 
intelligence has seen to it that creation is intelligence of the 
creator's noblest creature. Moreover, the existence of such a 
creator is demonstrable, according to Aquinas, by natural rea-
son, that is, unaided by revelation, upon examination of our 
experience of the world. Everything must have a cause, but to 
have anything a first cause must existo In the Stoic as weH as 
the Christian Natural Law Theories benevolence as weH as 
intelligence rules the universe. AH things not only make sense 
but somehow aH things will work out for the best as righteous-
ness triumphs. This is very frightening. If we have to make a 
commitment to divinity in order to justify a theory, say, of the 
limits of sovereignty, then we are getting into deeper water than 
is safe. God is the capstone of Natural Law Theory but is the 
cop-out according to critics who see the appeal to divinity as a 
problematic closing of justification. Granted that the God of 
Natural Law is the god of the philosophers and not necessarily 
that of traditional religion, yet aH the questions raised by philo-
sophy, and all the answers proposed by religion, concerning 
divinity come to haunt the foundation of Natural Law. Current 
philosophers eager to get on with problems in law, politics, or 
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ethics, may simply avoid Natural Law Theory because attached 
to its trunk is the hornet's nest of divinity. Natural Law Theory 
smacks of an outdated mode of philosophizing, for it bears a 
metaphysical odor. 
The saving grace of Natural Law Theory appeared to be its 
welcome offering of a sense of tranquillity to the theorist who 
may feel at home as an intelligence in a world of rational prin-
cipIes. But this consolation may act like a drug to draw us 
away from the world that counts: this world of contingency and 
suffering that I encounter not as universal intelligence but as 
my mortal self. When Cicero or Seneca meet thepainful folly 
of the world with composure because their souls dwell safely in 
the realm governed by Natural Law, do they not fool them-
selves that all will be well or that all in some deep sense is well? 
The horror that all is not well needs to be experienced by thin-
kers who face the world squarely. That peace of mind that 
comes from recognition of an eternal order is not enough conso-
lation in this world about to be incinerated by its allegedly 
rational inhabitants. 
All the aboye has been one big accusation levelled against 
Natural Law as too confidentIy smoothing out the wrinkles of 
life by its questionable trust in order, reason, and divinity. This 
confidence tends toward absolutismo We need in philosophy 
more flexibility, diversity, passion, and inconsolability. 
2. The second great charge againts Natural Law Theory is 
that in the poli tic al realm it gets in the way of a better theory: 
Natural Rights. Natural Rights: yeso Natural Law: no. We can 
better recognize the right theory, which is the Rights Theory if 
we get rid of the Natural Law Theory with which it has been 
entangled unnecessarily. Cut the useless anchor and let the ship 
of rights sail on its own steam. And change the name on the 
bow of our ship from Natural Rights to Human Rights. There 
we have a vessel worth the voyage through all seas of the 
modern world. Left behind is the outmoded vessel of Natu-
ral Law. 
Natural Law refers to principIes of reason, whereas Natural 
Rights refers to persons. In personhood as a human being are 
inviolable rights. In reason, which human beings share, are 
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inviolable principIes, according to the outmoded theory. While 
among the rational principIes of Natural Law Theory may be 
found universal rights of persons, we can just as well begin 
with Human Rights and locate the use of reason, publically as 
well as privately, among them. The latter move is preferable. 
For it avoids the controversy over the identity and content of 
reason. Indeed, Human Rights theory lets thinkers define and 
practice reason in .endless ways with no absolute commitment 
to any principIes of reason. In moving from a reason-centered 
to a person-centered theory we avoid smashing up on the philo-
sophic rocks while we enhance the freedom of individual s as 
thinkers. Human Rights, then, are more than matters of reason: 
they are discoverable by examination of human existence, by 
self-evidence, by insight, or by experience. And Human Rights, 
though recognized in their grand foundations, are still open to 
further discovery, not as deductions, but as illuminations that 
accompany the encounter of new human situations. Human 
Rights are embedded existentially in our adventure as human 
beings on earth such that they possess an open-ended creative 
dimensiono Natural Laws on the other hand are rational abs-
tractions in a deductive system that aspires to closure. The 
lived world drops out of the latter picture. Human Rights 
Theory is forward-Iooking, dynamic, and dedicated to changing 
the world. Natural Law Theory looks instead to the unchang-
ing, hence, static, grounds of a realm of principIes. Whereas 
Human Rights discourse easily motivates actioil, Natural Law 
tal k is an inactive contemplation. A difference of temperament 
is likely involved in prefering one or other of these theo-
ries. 
When pressed for its guarantees Natural Law Theory 
appeals to divinity as ordering the great chain of being that 
links humanity and the rest of nature. But Human Rights 
Theory need go no further than humanity to justify its c1aims 
and this strengthens the commitment that we are rightbearers by 
virtue of being human. Human Rights are rightfully the due of 
human beings, no thanks to God. And Human Rights need not 
be connected with the orderliness of nature. Indeed, rights often 
operate as normative commitments that go against the grain of 
natural operations. Humanity refuses to conform to the Darwi-
nian law of nature. Human Rights Theory, then, keeps the ball-
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game in the proper court, whereas Natural Law Theory in con-
necting everything as the playing field could only weaken the 
Human Rights area. This criticism is not just of the overreach-
ing scope of Natural Rights Theory but of its ontology. When 
the Declaration of Independence opens with an appeal to «the 
Laws of Nature and of Nature's God», persuasive connections 
are effectively made to eighteenth-century thinkers on behalf of 
rights. In the twentieth century such an appeal is neither effec-
tive nor necessary. Human Rights may speak for themselves. 
3. The third and last attack 1 shall make on Natural Rights 
is in the legal sphere and amounts to this: they don't exist. The 
accusation springs from a commitment to Positive Law Theory. 
In this perspective, Natural Laws being unlegislated and not 
subject to sovereign enforcement, are no laws. Sorne Natural 
Laws may indeed become Positive Laws, but then they have no 
special status. Sorne Natural Laws may be active as moral 
principIes or as wishful thinking, but then they remain outside 
the law strictIy speaking. Thus, the very term «Natural Law» 
should be dissolved. Even talk about scientific laws of nature is 
misleading, since law should only be undertood as enforceable 
enactment. No sovereign: no law. The laws are discovable, 
then, not by deductively consulting reason, but by inductively 
consulting practice. Universal and timeless laws are scarcely to 
be expected, for law operates within a polity under a regime. 
Comparative Law teaches us about the plurality of legal sys-
tems and hence of laws. Natural Law Theory is too idealistic, 
envisioning everything of importance to have been settled. Posi-
tive Law Theory is realistic, seeing that room always exists for 
changing the law. The noble vision of Natural Law gets in the 
way of the practical challenge to law-making. Thus, Grotius 
writes confidentIy of the Natural Law foundation to internatio-
nal law without adequate attention to means of legislation or 
assurance of enforcement. Concerning international law a stu-
dent once asked a professor in law school, «What should we 
prospective lawyers know about it?» «That there isn 't any», 
was the pithy reply. Unenforceable agreements do not have the 
status of law, and while there are treaties, conventions, and 
customs, no so lid body of international law yet exists, despite 
the well-meant and misleading c1aims of Natural Law Theorists. 
If genuine international law is to emerge, say, to prevent global 
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holocaust, a global sovereign will have to be entrusted with 
enforcement. Reason, alas, does not enforce its so-called Natu-
ral Laws. 
1 have made these three critiques of Natural Law Theory in 
its overall philosophic position, its status in political discourse, 
and its place in legal discourse, in extreme and perhaps exagge-
rated terms as if 1 were trying to exorcize a demon that has 
had a firm grasp upon my soul. Getting rid of Natural Law 
frees me as philosopher, political thinker, and theorist of law to 
do other things with more chance of success. Natural Law 
Theory blocks my path in significant ways. Even if the theory 
could be made sound, it would still not be best for the aims of 
philosophy, politics, and law. Rather than make it sound, let us 
turn our backs on it. 
But other positions, aH other positions, have similar difficul-
tieso For they are open to critical chaHenge to which they can-
not reply in a fuHy sound manner, and they are only partial 
contributions to dealing with great problems. Existentialism, 
Human Rights Theory, and Positive Law Theory have their 
problems. Thus, we may come back to Natural Law Theory to 
make good use of sorne of its features once we have tasted of 
the shortcomings of more promising ways of thinking. This, 
then, is how upon second thought 1 become a Natural Law 
theorist. 1 try to answer the attacks 1 have mounted. 
1. Natural Law Theory has an inevitable attraction for the 
philosopher as the insistence upon intelligibility of humanity 
and nature. The philosopher's imperative is: seek the intelligibi-
lit y of aH things. Philosophy is largely a presumption in favor 
of finding the laws that govern every kind of existence, al-
though it is not certain that such laws will be found. It doesn't 
hurt to look. And this is a useful presumption, for we might 
well find, say, principies that govern our humanity. And if 
such principies as laws of nature are nothing but laws of rea-
son, then the pre-eminenent instrument of philosophical activity, 
reason, may be put to good use on behalf of a worthy activity. 
As philosopher 1 cannot silence the demands of reason to jus-
tify its principies. Thereby 1 share something with others, with 
Epictetus the slave and Aurelius the emperor, which seems to 
have an independence from my self, my way of thinking and 
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my passions. Natural Law Theory opens the forum to rational 
sharing by every thinker. Sorne content of Natural Law is about 
reason itself so that reason finds its eloquent defense and 
expression in Natural Law. Natural Law as reason 's construct 
must then be dear to one who tries, intermittently, to live in 
accordance with reason. To avoid Natural Law, then, or to veto 
its legitimacy is to miss a valuable realm of the life of reason, 
which should be especially dear to the philosopher. I can asso-
ciate myself willingly with Natural Law Theory in its noble 
effort if I cannot acknowledge its success. «Try it», urges my 
reason, «you might not like its conclusions but the effort is 
worthwhile». Thus, while on guard against that absolutism in 
Natural Law Theory, I give it a try on behalf of reason. N atu-
ral Law Theory can be practiced in mid-stream by reason alone 
without resort to divinity. In the twentieth century we can work 
on Natural Law without God. We might also be better able to 
work on God without Natural Law. 
A consoling peacedoes come with recognition by reason of 
what is ever right, even if the world perversely pursues the 
wrongcourse. We need consolations in a self-destructive world. 
We need ataste of internal peace if we are to keep up the fight 
to prevent total human immolation. Passion is needed but it 
may be aided by the firmness of reason which instills inner 
calmo We live in contingency, in the unique now, in the human 
situation we are creating, but it cannot hurt to have sorne con-
nection to ideals that stand behind all human situations. N atu-
ral Law enriches the encounter with the world in its particularity. 
Sorne principIes of existentialism might even be reformulated 
and expanded in Natural Law terms. 
2. While my preference is for Natural Rights Theory over 
Natural Law Theory, the two need not be antithetical. Indeed, 
Natural Law has been a standard grounding for Natural Rights. 
Hobbes, for instance, does a very nice job in Leviathan of 
drawing rights out of Laws of Nature considered artieles of reason, 
and then basing polity on such rights. Since Human Righfs 
Theory has its problems of justification, Natural Law remains 
available for its rational grounding. The more we loo k at speci-
fic Human Rights and answer the questions, «How do you 
know this is a right?» and «From where do we get such a 
A SKEPTlCAL APPRECIATlON OF NATURAL LAW THEORY 223 
right?» the more we may speak in Natural Law terms. That 
dicourse is also helpful as we discuss the ranking or trade-off of 
rights. Human Rights Theory can and ought to be supported by 
other modes of explanation and justification, so that Human 
Rights Theory should not be confounded with Natural Law 
Theory, yet Natural Law is one highly use fuI and well-
practiced support. 
3. The attack waged by Positive Law Theory that no such 
thing as Natural Law exists is the least troubling, of the accu-
sations for philosophers are accustomed to valuing things they 
know do not existo Positive Law itself has severe limitations, 
such as openness to oppression, and it is in our interest to 
detect Natural Law implications imbedded in a body of Positive 
Law. Sorne dictates of reason may well be proposed for enact-
ment so that the Natural Law taken for granted may be expli-
citly entered into the law . A case may be made for the 
precedente of unlegislated Human Rights over enacted laws. 
Here the Natural Law would come to the defense of what per-
force is indefensible in Positive Law. Finally, the non-existence 
of international law, in the sense of an enforceable body of 
laws, must not inhibit the development of law between nations 
since the world's existence is at stake. Natural Law, though it 
has no legal status in the narrowest sense, can be the guide of 
international conduct, first as the conscience of the world, then 
as principIes generally agreed upon, next as customary beha-
vior, and finally as laws recognized as binding and given as-
sured enforcement. Desirable growth is possible from Natural 
Law to Positive Law, while Natural Law always remain avail-
able to attack the oppression of human beings that misguided 
Positive Laws may enforce. 
1 stand for Natural Law, then, insofar as it stands for rea-
son, humanity, and justice . 
